Kognitivna osjetljivost na anksioznost: Most između ličnosti i simptoma by Mirjana Sučević & Ana Kurtović
Psihologijske teme, 28 (2019), 2, 419-440 
Izvorni znanstveni rad 
doi:https://doi.org/10.31820/pt.28.2.10 
UDC: 159.923.3.072 
           616.89-008.441 
 
 
 Ana Kurtović, Filozofski fakultet Osijek, Odsjek za psihologiju, L. Jagera 9, 31000 Osijek, 




Cognitive Vulnerabilities to Anxiety: A Bridge  
between Personality and Symptoms 
 
Mirjana Sučević and Ana Kurtović 
University of J. J. Strossmayer in Osijek, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, 





The purpose of the study was to examine the effects of personality, anxiety sensitivity, intolerance 
of uncertainty and self-esteem on different anxiety symptoms. A total of 436 university students 
completed measures of personality, anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty, self-esteem, and 
symptoms of panic, worry and social anxiety. Results have shown that neuroticism, 
conscientiousness and psychological concerns (anxiety sensitivity) predict symptoms of panic and 
that psychological concerns mediate the relationship between neuroticism and panic. Worry was 
predicted by neuroticism, prospective and inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty and self-liking, with 
intolerance of uncertainty mediating between neuroticism and worry. Finally, neuroticism, 
openness to experiences and extraversion, as well as social concerns (anxiety sensitivity), 
inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty and self-liking predicted social anxiety. Social concerns, 
inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty and self-liking mediated the effects of neuroticism and 
extraversion on social anxiety. Results offer support to neuroticism being a universal risk factor 
and anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem having specific effects on 
anxiety symptoms.  
 







Anxiety is a normative part of life, and hardly any person does not experience 
mild anxiety on a daily basis. However, persistent anxiety symptoms can lead to 
anxiety disorders. Panic disorder, social phobia (social anxiety disorder) and 
generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) are some of the most common anxiety disorders. 
Furthermore, symptoms of panic disorder, social phobia and GAD are very common 
in nonclinical population. Given the fact that subclinical levels of symptoms also 
impair one's functioning, and can lead to anxiety disorders and other comorbid 
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conditions, it is important to examine factors that make a person vulnerable to anxiety 
symptoms and disorders. Insight into factors associated with elevated symptoms of 
anxiety disorders could prove to be beneficial in creating more focused preventive 
efforts by targeting factors, which show the strongest effects. Models explaining the 
link between personality and psychopathology, while useful in explaining general 
vulnerability to internalizing versus externalizing symptoms, are lacking in their 
ability to explain the differences in vulnerabilities to specific symptoms or disorders 
(Hong, 2013; Hong & Paunonen, 2011). Cognitive models of anxiety, on the other 
hand, have identified proximal factors, which might explain the differences in 
pathways from personality dispositions to specific anxiety symptoms (Norton, 
Sexton, Walker, & Norton, 2005). Based on findings that neuroticism is a universal 
risk factor, we assumed that it would be associated panic symptoms, worry, and fear 
of negative evaluation, but that anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and 




Personality factors have been linked to anxiety symptoms and disorders in 
numerous studies. When examining the relations of personality dimensions (most 
often Big five), the majority of studies have found neuroticism and extraversion to 
be relevant in predicting anxiety. However, neuroticism was not found to be specific 
of any anxiety disorder, which supports the notion that it is a basic disposition 
common to all anxiety disorders (Kaplan, Levinson, Rodebaugh, Menatti, & Weeks, 
2015). In other words, neuroticism was found to differentiate well between people 
with anxiety disorders and general population but was not useful in differentiating 
between anxiety disorders (Watson, Gamez, & Simms, 2005). Extraversion most 
consistently showed strong negative correlations with social anxiety (Kotov, Gamez, 
Schmidt, & Watson, 2010; Watson et al., 2005; Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2014), 
while the results regarding other personality dimensions are less clear. While some 
studies show little correlation with psychopathological symptoms (Kotov et al., 
2010), other suggest that their relationship with anxiety should be more closely 
examined (Kaplan et al., 2015; Watson et al., 2005; Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 
2014). However, given the relative lack of diagnostic specificity of personality 
dimensions, an argument can be made that research should focus on more narrow 
categories of cognitive style as possible mediators between personality and 
outcomes. With progress in the psychological treatment of anxiety disorders, 
especially in the field of cognitive behavioural therapies, research has focused on 
cognitive factors in explaining personal vulnerabilities to anxiety disorders. Anxiety 
sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and self-view have gained the most attention.  
 
  
Sučević, M., Kurtović, A: 
Cognitive Vulnerability to Anxiety 
421 
Anxiety Sensitivity  
 
Anxiety sensitivity is conceptualized as fear of symptoms or sensations related 
to anxiety, due to the belief that those symptoms will have negative physical, 
psychological or social ramifications (McNally, 2002; Reiss & McNally, 1985). A 
person can be afraid of a sense of nervousness because he or she interprets it as a sign 
of loss of control, oncoming disease or potential source of embarrassment. Further 
research has demonstrated that anxiety sensitivity is related to, but independent of, 
trait anxiety. In other words, a person can have a tendency to react anxiously across 
many situations but not be afraid of the possible consequences of those symptoms 
(Naragon-Gainey, 2010; Rector, Szacun-Shimizu, & Leybman, 2007). The construct 
of anxiety sensitivity overlaps with diagnostic criteria for panic disorder, which 
emphasize the importance of fear of future panic attacks (Reiss, 1991). Indeed, 
patients with panic disorder exhibit more anxiety sensitivity than the general 
population or patients with other anxiety disorders (Deacon & Abramowitz, 2006), 
and anxiety sensitivity is a better predictor of panic attacks in experimental 
manipulation situations than trait anxiety (Eke & McNally, 1996; McNally, 2002; 
Rapee & Medoro, 1994). It is important to emphasize that studies, also, show that 
anxiety sensitivity is not merely a correlate of panic disorder, but rather a specific 
premorbid risk factor (Maller & Reiss, 1992; Schmidt, Lerew, & Jackson, 1997). 
Studies examining the relations of individual factors of anxiety sensitivity with 
anxiety disorders have resulted in interesting findings regarding the role of anxiety 
sensitivity in explaining other psychopathological symptoms. Social concerns were 
most strongly related to social anxiety, physical concerns with panic, while the 
effects of psychological concerns were less related to panic as well as symptoms of 
GAD (Blais et al., 2001; Deacon & Abramowitz, 2006; Naragon-Gainey, 2010; 
Rector et al., 2007). Therefore, anxiety sensitivity is an important factor in 
understanding aetiology, as well as maintenance of symptoms of anxiety disorders. 
However, its specific effects still warrant examination, mostly regarding the effects 
on symptoms of anxiety disorders, other than panic.  
 
Intolerance of Uncertainty  
 
Intolerance of uncertainty is a relatively broad construct entailing cognitive, 
emotional and behavioural reactions to uncertainty in everyday situations (Freeston, 
Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994). However, not everyone will 
experience anxiety when faced with uncertainty. The level of tolerance for 
uncertainty is likely to be a factor explaining those differences, and a factor which 
may increase the risk of anxiety disorders if intolerance is high (Carleton, Sharpe, & 
Asmundson, 2007). Intolerance of uncertainty was originally related to Generalized 
anxiety disorder. Dugas, Gagnon, Ladouceur, and Freeston (1998) suggested a model 
of GAD emphasizing the role of intolerance of uncertainty, cognitive avoidance, 
positive metacognitive beliefs about worry and negative problem orientation. 
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Intolerance of uncertainty was considered the main factor contributing to the 
frequency of "What if…" questions, which are anxiety-provoking. Indeed, studies 
show that intolerance of uncertainty was the most relevant factor in differentiating 
between people with GAD and controls (Dugas, Gosselin, & Ladouceur, 2011; 
Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000; Thielsch, Andor, & Ehring, 2015; Van der 
Heiden et al., 2010). Differentiating between prospective and inhibitory intolerance 
of uncertainty offered interesting information about relations between intolerance of 
uncertainty and other anxiety disorders. In prospective intolerance, a person takes an 
active approach to uncertainty, seeking potential solutions in order to reduce the 
unpleasant feeling associated with uncertainty, while inhibitory intolerance of 
uncertainty leads to passivity and avoidant behavioural patterns (Carleton, Norton, 
& Asmundson, 2007). Prospective intolerance of uncertainty has been shown to 
mediate the relationship between neuroticism and generalized anxiety disorder, 
while inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty mediated the effects of neuroticism on 
panic and social anxiety (McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012). Therefore, the initial 
assumption that intolerance of uncertainty is a specific risk factor for generalized 
anxiety disorder seems to have been premature, since recent studies suggest that 
intolerance of uncertainty may be a non-specific trans-diagnostic factor in 




The majority of research has focused on the predictive power of self-esteem in 
explaining depression symptoms, while less is known about its relationship with 
anxiety symptoms (Eisenbarth, 2012; Jelić, 2012; Lee, Dickson, Conley, & 
Holmbeck, 2014). There are studies suggesting weaker, but stable relationship 
between different anxiety symptoms, especially social anxiety, and measures of 
global self-esteem (Kocovski & Endler, 2000; Radovanović & Glavak, 2003; 
Sowislo & Orth, 2013). However, global self-esteem has not been shown as a 
specific correlate of social anxiety (Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009). Given the problems 
associated with global measures of self-esteem (Jelić, 2012; Tafarodi & Swann, 
1995), it is reasonable to assume that predominant use of such global measures could 
have masked important effects. Measures focusing on different facets of self-esteem, 
such as self-liking and self-competence, have been shown to be useful in explaining 
the effects of self-esteem on different outcomes (Tafarodi & Swann, 1995). Self-
liking reflects one's view of oneself as a good or bad person, or a desirable social 
object, while self-competence reflect one's view of oneself as having skills and 
abilities to attaint socially desirable goals. Given the fact that there are indications 
that individuals high on self-competence might, at the same time, be low on self-
liking (Jelić, 2012), we considered it worthwhile to examine the possible differences 
in their effects.  
The purpose of our study was threefold. First, to expand on the findings 
regarding direct and indirect effects of all five personality dimensions on different 
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anxiety symptoms, given the fact that openness to experience, conscientiousness and 
agreeableness have received less attention than neuroticism and extraversion. 
Second, to examine a specific effect of facets of anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of 
uncertainty and self-esteem in order to shed light on the question whether those 
effects are specific or trans-diagnostic. Third, to examine the possibility of anxiety 
sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem mediating between personality 
dimensions and anxiety symptoms. Given the relative lack of research on specific 
effects of cognitive variables on different anxiety symptoms in Croatia, we hope to 
replicate existing findings and expand on our understanding of cognitive 





Participants and Procedure 
 
A total of 436 university students, aged 18 to 42 (M = 21.21, SD = 2.80) 
participated in the study. There were 208 male (47.7%) and 225 female (51.6%) 
students, with 3 participants who did not indicate gender (0.7%). The study was 
conducted during regular classes following approval of the institutional ethics 
committee and individual faculties' deans. Students, who were present during each 
class, participated in the study. All students present at the time gave their consent for 
participation, which resulted in a heterogeneous sample of students from different 
fields of study (medicine, natural sciences, agriculture, engineering, social studies 
and humanities). Participants were made aware of the voluntary, anonymous and 
confidential nature of the study, and that they were free to terminate their 




Personality. Personality dimensions were measured using Big Five Inventory (BFI; 
Benet-Martinez & John, 1998). A 44-item questionnaire measures neuroticism, 
openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion and agreeableness. 
Participants were expected to respond to what extent does certain item refer to them 
on a 5-point scale (ranging from 1 – not at all to 5 – completely). Composite scores 
are calculated as a mean value of responses on items in the individual subscale. 
Internal consistency coefficients were .83 for neuroticism, .80 for extraversion, .80 
for conscientiousness, .78 for agreeableness and .73 for openness to experience. 
Anxiety sensitivity. Anxiety sensitivity was measured using Anxiety Sensitivity 
Index (ASI; Reis, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986). ASI is a 16-item measure of 
a person's fear that he or she will experience anxiety symptoms, which will have 
negative physical, psychological and social consequences. Participants were 
expected to answer about the extent to which an item is true for them on a 5-point 
scale (ranging from 1 – not true at all to 5 – completely true). Composites are 
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calculated by adding the items on individual subscales (physical concerns, 
psychological concerns and social concerns) or the whole scale, with higher scores 
indicating higher anxiety sensitivity (Rodriguez, Bruce, Pagano, Spencer, & Keller, 
2004). Internal consistency coefficients were .78 for psychological concerns, .86 for 
social concerns, .89 for physical concerns, and .90 for overall anxiety sensitivity.  
Intolerance of uncertainty. Intolerance of uncertainty was measured using 
Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale – Short form (IUS-12; Carleton et al., 2007). IUS-
12 is a short form (12 items) of the original Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale 
(Freestone et al., 1994). It is a highly reliable measure ( = .91) with high correlation 
with the original scale (r = .96). Participants were expected to respond on a 5-point 
scale about the extent to which an item is true for them (ranging from 1 – not true at 
all to 5 – completely true). Composite scores for prospective and inhibitory 
intolerance of uncertainty are calculated by adding the items for each subscale, or for 
the whole scale, with higher scores indicating higher intolerance of uncertainty. 
Internal consistency coefficients were .80 for prospective, .82 for inhibitory 
intolerance of uncertainty, and .89 for overall intolerance of uncertainty.  
Self-esteem. Self-esteem was measured using Self Liking Self Competence Scale-
Revised (SLSC-R; Tafarodi & Swann, 2001). SLSC-R is a 16-item measure of both 
global self-esteem and two domains; self-liking (one's view of oneself as a good 
person and a desirable social object) and self-competence (one's view of oneself as 
having abilities one needs to attain socially desirable goals). Participants were 
expected to respond on a 5-point scale about the extent to which an item is true for 
them (ranging from 1 – not true at all to 5 – completely true). Composite scores for 
self-liking and self-competence are calculated by adding items corresponding to each 
subscale, or for the whole scale, with higher scores indicating higher self-esteem. 
Internal consistency coefficients were .87 for self-liking, .76 for self-competence, 
and .88 for overall self-esteem.  
Panic. Becks anxiety inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) was used 
as a measure of symptoms of panic. BAI is a widely used 21-item measure of 
physical and cognitive anxiety symptoms which closely overlap with symptoms of a 
panic attack. Although it is not a measure of panic per se, it is often used to measure 
symptoms of panic disorder, and some authors agree that it, in fact, measures panic 
rather than general anxiety symptoms (Cox, Cohen, Direnfeld, & Swinson, 1996). 
Participant are expected to respond on a 4-point scale about the extent to which each 
symptom bothered them during the past week (ranging from 0 – not at all to 3 – 
severely, it bothered me a lot). Composite is calculated by adding all 21 items with a 
higher score indicating higher anxiety. Internal consistency coefficient was .91.  
Worry. Penn State Worry Questionaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990) was used to measure worry as a central characteristic of generalized 
anxiety disorder. It is a 16-item measure of a person tendency for worry in everyday 
situations. Participants were expected to respond on a 5-point scale about the extent 
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to which an item is true for them (ranging from 1 – not true at all to 5 – completely 
true). Composite scores are calculated by adding all 16 items, with higher scores 
indicating more worry. Internal consistency coefficient was .91.  
Social anxiety. Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (BFNE; Leary, 1983) was 
used as a measure of social anxiety. This is a 12-item measure of fear of being 
negatively evaluated in social situations. Participants were expected to respond on a 
5-point scale about the extent to which an item is true for them (ranging from 0 – not 
true at all to 4 – completely true). Composite scores are calculated by adding all 12 
items, with higher scores indicating more fear of negative evaluation. Internal 





Descriptive data are presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Data for Personality Dimensions, Anxiety Sensitivity, Intolerance of Uncertainty, 
Self-Esteem, and Anxiety Symptoms 






Neuroticism  2.72 0.69 1-5 1.13-4.75  0.16 -0.13 
Openness to experience 3.49 0.60 1-5 1.89-4.80  0.07 -0.49 
Conscientiousness 3.49 0.63 1-5 1.67-5.00  0.04  0.25 
Extraversion 3.52 0.63 1-5 1.75-5.00 -0.18 -0.22 
Agreeableness 3.52 0.57 1-5 1.78-4.89 -0.16 -0.17 
Anxiety sensitivity 22.71 11.30 16-80 16-77  0.44 -0.41 
Intolerance of 
uncertainty 
33.83 9.11 12-60 13-59  0.03 -0.43 
Self-liking 29.67 6.22 8-40 11-40 -0.41 -0.38 
Self-competence 26.26 4.47 8-40 13-40  0.30  0.27 
Panic 10.43 9.29 0-63 0-49 1.38  1.87 
Worry 50.94 11.98 16-80 21-80 -0.06 -0.44 
Social anxiety 21.59 9.08 0-48 0-47  0.18 -0.24 
 
On average, descriptive data suggest that participants are not prone to panic, 
while mean values for worry and social anxiety are moderately high, which is 
expected in a non-clinical sample Also, they seem to be more bothered by intolerance 
of uncertainty and low self-esteem than anxiety sensitivity. However, comparison of 
theoretical and obtained range does suggest that there are a number of students at risk 
for anxiety disorders, as obtained ranges for worry and social anxiety are almost 
identical to theoretical ranger.  
Table 2 shows correlation coefficients between variables. We also included 
gender to see if its effect needs to be controlled for in later analyses.  
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calculated by adding the items on individual subscales (physical concerns, 
psychological concerns and social concerns) or the whole scale, with higher scores 
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as a measure of symptoms of panic. BAI is a widely used 21-item measure of 
physical and cognitive anxiety symptoms which closely overlap with symptoms of a 
panic attack. Although it is not a measure of panic per se, it is often used to measure 
symptoms of panic disorder, and some authors agree that it, in fact, measures panic 
rather than general anxiety symptoms (Cox, Cohen, Direnfeld, & Swinson, 1996). 
Participant are expected to respond on a 4-point scale about the extent to which each 
symptom bothered them during the past week (ranging from 0 – not at all to 3 – 
severely, it bothered me a lot). Composite is calculated by adding all 21 items with a 
higher score indicating higher anxiety. Internal consistency coefficient was .91.  
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As can be seen in Table 2, neuroticism (positively) and extraversion 
(negatively) were significantly correlated with all three criteria (panic, worry and 
social anxiety), while correlations of other personality dimensions with criteria were 
not as consistent. Anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem were 
all correlated with panic, worry and social anxiety with correlation coefficients 
ranging from .25 to .54. Gender was also significantly correlated with criteria, 
suggesting more panic, worry and social anxiety symptoms in female students.  
In order to examine the effects of personality, anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of 
uncertainty and self-esteem on panic, worry and social anxiety symptoms, three 
hierarchical regression analyses (HRA) were performed. Due to significant 
correlations between predictors, we examined whether multicollinearity was an issue 
using variance inflation factors (VIFs). VIFs ranged from 1.20 to 1.89, which is 
sufficiently low to assume that it would not significantly affect coefficient estimates. 
Gender was added in the first step in order to control for its effects, personality 
dimensions, which correlated with each criterion, were added in the second step, and 
anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem facets were added in 
the second step of each HRA. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analyses for Panic, Worry and Social Anxiety 
  Criterion 
 Predictors  Panic Worry Social anxiety 
Step 1  R² = .03** R² = .05*** R² = .01 
 β β β 
Gender .19*** .22** .09 
Step 2  ∆R² = .15*** ∆R² = .43*** ∆R² = .17*** 
  β β β 
 Gender .14** .05 .04 
Personality  
dimensions 
Neuroticism .31*** .70*** .31*** 
Openness to experiences - -.06 -.10* 
Conscientiousness -.17** - - 
Extraversion .01 .04 -.15** 
Agreeableness  -.02 .11** - 
Step 3  ∆R² = .19*** ∆R² = .10*** ∆R² = .16*** 
  β β β 
 Gender .10* .06 .04 
 Neuroticism .04 .52*** .08 
 Openness to experiences - -.07 -.11* 
 Conscientiousness -.13* - - 
 Extraversion .09 .09* -.02 
 Agreeableness  -.03 .11** - 
Anxiety 
sensitivity 
Physical concerns .09 .09 .04 
Psychological concerns .38*** .05 -.06 
Social concerns -.10* -.02 .13* 
Intolerance of 
uncertainty 
Prospective .00 .18*** .09 
Inhibitory .12 .12* .17* 
 Self-liking -.05 -.10* -.33*** 
 Self-competence -.09 .06 .06 
Total R²  .37 .57 .34 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
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As shown in Table 3, female gender predicted more symptoms of panic. After 
controlling for the effect of gender, only neuroticism (positively) and 
conscientiousness (negatively) predicted symptoms of panic. After controlling for 
gender and personality, psychological concerns (anxiety sensitivity) predicted more 
symptoms of panic. Social concerns (anxiety sensitivity), however, predicted fewer 
symptoms of panic. However, social concerns were positively correlated with panic, 
and further analysis revealed that their negative effect on panic was due to their 
correlation with psychological concerns, suggesting negative suppression effect 
(Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). Furthermore, after entering 
variables in the third step of HRA, the effect of neuroticism was reduced to a non-
significant level suggesting mediation.  
Female gender also predicted more worry. After controlling for gender, 
neuroticism and agreeableness predicted more worry, and after controlling for effects 
of gender and personality, both prospective and inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty 
(positively) and self-liking (negatively) predicted worry. However, once variables in 
the third step were entered, the effects of neuroticism were reduced (but still 
significant), suggesting partial mediation. Also, the effect of extraversion was 
significant and positive in the third step, and further analyses, again, suggested 
negative suppression.  
Finally, gender showed no significant effect on social anxiety, while 
neuroticism (positively), and both openness to experiences and extraversion 
(negatively) predicted social anxiety. After controlling for gender and personality, 
social concerns (anxiety sensitivity) and inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty 
predicted more symptoms, while self-liking predicted fewer symptoms. 
Furthermore, in the third step, neuroticism and extraversion were no longer 
significant predictors, suggesting mediated effects.  
Given the fact that there were reductions in effects of neuroticism and 
extraversion in third steps of hierarchical regression analyses, in order to examine 
possible mediations we used Hayes's (2009) bootstrapping method for testing 
mediation. Hayes's method allows for testing multiple mediations instead of a 
number of single mediation in Baron and Kenny's (1986) procedure.  
For panic, results have shown that the relationship between neuroticism and 
panic was mediated by psychological concerns (indirect effect = 3.1075; CI = 2.2775 
to 4.1551). A small direct effect was also significant (effect = 1.9934; CI = .7017 to 
3.2850), unlike the results of HRA which suggested full mediation.  
The results of mediation analyses for worry and social anxiety, containing 
multiple mediations, are shown in Table 4.  
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Table 4 
Summary of Results of Mediation Analyses for Worry and Social Anxiety 
 
As can be seen in Table 4, both prospective and inhibitory intolerance of 
uncertainty were significant mediators between neuroticism and worry. Further 
comparison of their individual effects revealed no significant difference (effect = 
.6327; CI = -.4934 to 1.8104). Direct effect of neuroticism on worry was still 
significant which is in accordance with results of HRA.  
Worry 
 Total effect of neuroticism on worry 
 Effect SE t p Bootstrapping BCa 
95% CI  11.6339 .6392 18.1997 .0000 10.3773 12.8905 
Direct effect of neuroticism on worry 
 Effect SE t p Bootstrapping BCa 
95% CI  8.7334 .7033 12.4185 .0000 7.350  10.1159 
Indirect effect of neuroticism on worry 
 
Total 
Prospective intolerance of uncertainty 
Inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty 
Self-liking 
Effect SE Bootstrapping BCa 
95% CI 2.9005 .4500 2.0757 3.8234 
1.2172 .4092 .4835 2.1189 
.5845 .2320 .1940 1.1076 
.3108 .2381 -.1320 .8120 
Social anxiety 
 Total effect of neuroticism on social anxiety 
 Effect SE t p Bootstrapping BCa 
95% CI 4.9026 .6034 8.1249 .0000 3.7164 6.0887 
Direct effect of neuroticism on social anxiety 
 Effect SE t p Bootstrapping BCa 
95% CI 1.2529 .6500 1.9275 .0546 -.024  2.5308 
Indirect effect of neuroticism on social anxiety 
 Effect SE Bootstrapping BCa 
95% CI Total 3.6496 .5061 2.718  4.7080 
Social concerns .3787 .2132 .0147 .8653 
Inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty 1.4395 .3277 .8446 2.1308 
Self-liking 1.1918 .3138 .6607 1.9061 
Total effect of extraversion on social anxiety 
 Effect SE t p Bootstrapping BCa 
95% CI -3.3569 .6855 -4.8969 .0000 -4.7044 -2.0093 
Direct effect of extraversion on social anxiety 
 Effect SE t p Bootstrapping BCa 
95% CI -.2572 .6593 -.3901 .6967 -1.5532 1.0389 
Indirect effect of extraversion on social anxiety 
 Effect SE Bootstrapping BCa 
95% CI Total -3.0997 .4897 -4.1143 -2.1982 
Social concerns .2683 .1422 .0623 .6453 
Inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty -1.0626 .2768 -1.7158 -.6097 
Self-liking -1.5988 .3460 -2.3897 -.9976 
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Analyses for social anxiety showed that both neuroticism and extraversion 
effects were mediated by social concerns (anxiety sensitivity), inhibitory intolerance 
of uncertainty and self-liking. Both neuroticism and extraversion direct effects were 
not significant. However, further comparison of the individual indirect effects 
revealed some interesting differences. Neuroticism effects through inhibitory 
intolerance of uncertainty (effect = 1.0608; CI = .2376 to 1.8787) and self-liking 
(effect = .8131; CI = .1305 to 1.6327) were significantly stronger than the effect 
through social concerns, which suggest anxiety sensitivity to be the weakest mediator 
of the relationship between neuroticism and social anxiety. In comparison, 
extraversion effect through social concerns was significantly stronger than effects 
through inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty (effect = -1.3309; CI = -2.0006 to -
.8377) and self-liking (effect = -1.8671; CI = -2.6659 to -1.2022), suggesting that 
anxiety sensitivity is the strongest mediator of the relationship between extraversion 





The aim of our study was to examine effects of personality, anxiety sensitivity, 
intolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem on symptoms of panic, worry and social 
anxiety, and try to expand on the existing knowledge of their specific or trans-
diagnostic relevance. 
Results of the correlational analysis were in line with studies demonstrating the 
relevance of neuroticism (as a universal risk factor) and extraversion (as a universal 
protective factor) in explaining different psychopathological symptoms. Anxiety 
sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem correlated with panic, worry 
and social anxiety. Although there were differences in the magnitude of correlation 
coefficients suggesting that anxiety sensitivity has stronger relations with panic and 
worry, intolerance of uncertainty with worry and self-esteem with social anxiety, we 
feel that those differences were not impressive enough to support the assumption of 
specific effects.  
Results of hierarchical regression analyses, however, have shown some very 
interesting differences in their effects. Symptoms of panic were predicted by higher 
neuroticism and lower conscientiousness. However, even though Hayes's 
bootstrapping method suggested that there was still significant direct effect of 
neuroticism, the majority of its effect on the symptom of panic is due to the relation 
between neuroticism and psychological concerns (anxiety sensitivity). It is 
reasonable to assume that if one is prone to frequent unpleasant emotions, such as 
fear or sadness, one can develop a fear of possible implications or consequences of 
those feelings. Our results are in accordance with studies demonstrating the general 
impact of neuroticism on a broad spectrum of anxiety symptoms and a specific 
impact of anxiety sensitivity on symptoms of panic (Maller & Reiss, 1992; Schmidt 
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et al., 1997; Sexton, Norton, Walker, & Norton, 2003). Most studies examining the 
effect of anxiety sensitivity have focused on an overall measure of anxiety sensitivity. 
Studies examining the effects of individual facets of anxiety sensitivity on different 
psychopathological symptoms have mostly shown that physical concerns are most 
strongly related to panic (Deacon & Valentiner, 2001; Jurin & Biglbauer, 2018; 
Rector et al., 2007), psychological concerns with depression, GAD and PTSD (Lang, 
Kennedy, & Stein, 2002; Rector et al., 2007; Vujanovic, Zvolensky, & Bernstein, 
2008), while social concerns are most strongly related to social anxiety (Naragon-
Gainey, 2010; Rector et al., 2007; Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996). Our results suggest 
greater importance of a cognitive aspect of anxiety sensitivity, the fear that one is 
losing control over one's cognitive capacities, than fear of physical symptoms alone 
or social consequences of anxiety, which is somewhat surprising given the fact that 
catastrophic misinterpretations of physical symptoms play a major role in panic 
disorder. However, Deacon and Valentiner (2001) found that both physical concerns 
and psychological concerns were highest in participants who have had a panic attack 
in the last year. Given the fact that our sample consisted of students, all of whom 
were young and probably healthy, it is possible that their major concerns were 
consequences of anxiety in terms of damage to their cognitive functioning, which 
would jeopardize their academic functioning. Although the effect of 
conscientiousness on symptoms of panic could be mediated by other factors not 
examined in our study, our results suggest that its effect is small but direct. 
Conscientiousness has been associated with anxiety symptoms (Kotov et al., 2010). 
Poor ability for goal oriented behavior and poor impulse control could predispose an 
individual to making catastrophic conclusions about the meaning of symptoms of 
panic more easily, as well as avoidance, which is an important behavior characteristic 
of panic disorder.  
The strongest predictor of worry was neuroticism, which affected worry both 
directly and indirectly through intolerance of uncertainty. Neuroticism can lead to 
selective attention on unclear and potentially harmful information, as well as 
overestimation of dangers and the likelihood of a negative outcome (Kotov et al., 
2010; Lommen, Engelhard, & Van den Hout, 2010; Watson et al., 2005; Watson & 
Naragon-Gainey, 2014), and worry can be a person's attempt to mentally solve a 
situation, or relieve tension associated with it. Both prospective and inhibitory 
intolerance of uncertainty mediated the relationship between neuroticism and worry, 
which is in line with studies demonstrating that people high on neuroticism, also, 
show elevated levels of uncertainty related stress (Berenbaum, Bredemeier, & 
Thompson, 2010; Dugas & Koerner, 2005), as well as stronger emotional responses 
to uncertainty than to negative feedback (Hirsh & Inzlicht, 2008). Similar to how 
depressed people filter out information that is not congruent with their current 
emotional state, individuals high on neuroticism may be constantly "on the lookout" 
for possible dangers, while ignoring information to the contrary, which makes them 
less tolerant of uncertain outcomes. Unique effects of intolerance of uncertainty were 
documented in other studies (Carleton, 2012; McEvoy & Mahoney, 2012), and its 
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effect was shown to be stronger than effects of positive metacognitive beliefs about 
worry, negative problem orientation, cognitive avoidance (Buhr & Dugas, 2002) and 
anxiety sensitivity (Dugas et al., 2001). Low self-liking, also, predicted worry, which 
is in line with some studies examining the relations of general self-esteem and worry 
(Meyer et al., 1990). The effect of self-liking could be a result of a general underlying 
psychological distress, or low sense of control, which is common in people prone to 
worry (Clark & Wells, 1995).  
Finally, fear of negative evaluation was predicted by neuroticism (positively), 
as well as openness to experiences and extraversion (negatively). Furthermore, 
neuroticism and extraversion effects were mediated by social concerns (anxiety 
sensitivity), inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty and self-liking, while openness to 
experiences had a direct effect. Results are, again, in line with studies demonstrating 
neuroticism as a universal risk factor, and extraversion as s protective factor against 
anxiety. However, they also support the advantage of examining specific rather than 
general traits in explaining specific anxiety symptoms. Neuroticism can lead to 
concerns about the implications of one's anxiety or if others see it, and fears that 
others will devalue a person because of it. Taking into account clinical presentations 
of social anxiety disorder, which include low self-esteem, fear that other will evaluate 
a person negatively, and avoidance of many social situations, it is not surprising that 
social concerns, inhibitory intolerance of uncertainty and self-liking predicted social 
anxiety. Concerns about social consequences of anxiety can contribute to one's fears 
of exhibiting anxiety in public and the conviction that it will lead to negative 
evaluation or social rejection (Deacon & Abramowitz, 2006). There has been some 
support for the relationship between intolerance uncertainty and social anxiety 
(Boelen & Reijntjes, 2009; Carleton, Collimore, & Asmundson, 2010; Teale Sapach, 
Carleton, Mulvogue, Weeks, & Heimberg, 2014). Social situations are, by nature, 
unclear due to verbal and nonverbal signs often being ambiguous. To a person with 
low tolerance of uncertainty, it may be very difficult to enter situations in which they 
are not certain of the outcome, so they might conclude that they should avoid it. Low 
self-liking, also, predicted social anxiety, which is in line with studies examining the 
relationship between self-esteem and social anxiety (Kocovski & Endler, 2000; 
Radovanović & Glavak, 2003). Some authors believe that social fears originate 
primarily from a person's view of oneself as not good enough and that people with 
social anxiety fear that, due to their perceived shortcomings, they will not be able to 
meet the demands of social situations (Jelić, 2012; Moscovitch, 2008). The fact that 
self-competence was not predictive of social anxiety suggests that one's perception 
of one's worth is crucial for protecting against social anxiety rather than one's 
perception of one's abilities.  
Extraversion effect was, also, mediated by social concerns, inhibitory 
intolerance of uncertainty and self-liking. Extraverts are sociable, dominant, 
assertive, confident in seeking social interactions, therefore it is expected they would 
not be burdened with social concerns, outcomes of social situations nor fears of 
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negative evaluation. However, people who are lacking in these qualities might also 
have low opinion of themselves, worry about outcomes, social implications of their 
anxiety, as well fear negative evaluation (Naragon-Gainey, Watson, & Markon, 
2009). The fact that extraversion only predicted social anxiety, while it had no 
significant effects on panic or worry, and that social concerns were the strongest 
mediator between extraversion and social anxiety supports the interpersonal 
importance of extraversion. As far as the negative effect of openness to experiences 
is concerned, it is in line with the results of a few studies (Kaplan et al., 2015; Watson 
& Naragon-Gainey, 2014). People low on openness are less interested in new 
experiences, including social ones, and the negative relation with social anxiety is 
not surprising given the tendency to avoid social situations, especially new and 
unfamiliar ones, in people with social anxiety.  
In conclusion, when examining the effects of personality, our results support the 
assumption of neuroticism being a universal risk factor across all anxiety symptoms, 
although it had the strongest effect on worry. This is in line with a few other studies 
suggesting that the relation between neuroticism and worry reflects the fact that 
worry is saturated with general psychological distress and anxious feeling, which are 
not focused on a particular object of fear, but rather on a broad spectrum of everyday 
situations (Watson et al., 2005; Watson & Naragon-Gainey, 2014). Results did not 
support the assumption of extraversion being a universal protective factor, however. 
They suggest that the protective role of extraversion, when it comes to anxiety, is 
mostly related to its interpersonal dimension. Although conscientiousness and 
openness to experiences showed effects on panic and social anxiety, our results do 
not offer sufficient information to draw a conclusion about their universal or specific 
effects. Results regarding anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty offer 
more support to the specificity of effects, with psychological concerns (anxiety 
sensitivity) having the largest effects on panic, and intolerance of uncertainty is 
having the largest cumulative effect on worry. Furthermore, self-liking had the 
largest effect on social anxiety, while interpersonal and inhibitory aspects of anxiety 
sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty, also had significant effect. Clearly, in 
understanding cognitive vulnerabilities research should focus on individual facets of 
anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem. Mediational analyses 
also support the assumption that neuroticism, as a largely genetically determined 
disposition common to all anxiety disorders, can make a person vulnerable to the 
development of certain traits and cognitive styles that increase the risk of the 
development of specific anxiety disorders.  
 
Implications and Future Directions 
 
Results of our study have some important practical implications. Interventions 
aimed at anxiety sensitivity and intolerance of uncertainty have been shown useful 
in treating anxiety symptoms (Carleton, 2012; Smits, Berry, Tart, & Powers, 2008). 
However, our results suggest that focusing on specific aspects of anxiety sensitivity 
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and intolerance of uncertainty could prove to be beneficial in tailoring interventions 
to a specific need of an individual, which may be overlooked in interventions aimed 
generally at anxiety sensitivity or intolerance of uncertainty. For example, a person 
whose anxiety sensitivity is concentrated around psychological concerns may not 
benefit as much from attempts to decatastrophizing the meaning of anxiety or panic 
symptoms. Likewise, it seems useful to assess whether someone's intolerance of 
uncertainty is mostly passive or active in order to use appropriate intervention. 
Passive or inhibitory intolerance could benefit more from interventions aimed at 
meaning and implications of uncertainty, while active or prospective intolerance 
might benefit more from targeting a sense of control, skills training or metacognitive 
beliefs about worry.  
Neuroticism, clearly, has an effect on different anxiety symptoms, as well as 
anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem. However, it is still 
unclear what determines whether a person high on neuroticism will develop anxiety 
sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and/or low self-esteem. Future research should 
focus on paths or conditions under which certain traits facilitate the development of 
cognitive vulnerabilities to specific anxiety symptoms. Focusing on facets of 
personality dimensions might increase our understanding of the links between 
personality, anxiety sensitivity, intolerance of uncertainty and self-esteem.  
Finally, some limitation of our study need to be mentioned. The sample 
consisted of university students, which limits the generalization to both clinical and 
general population, given the fact that studies suggest that students experience more 
psychopathological symptoms than their same-aged peers (Blanco, Okuda, & 
Wright, 2008; Hunt & Eisenberg, 2010). Self-report measures were used, which also 
limits conclusions regarding clinical levels of symptoms, as well as raise concerns 
about the appropriateness of measures for symptoms of anxiety disorders. While 
authors agree that BAI mostly measures panic symptoms, it does not cover diagnostic 
criteria of panic disorder. Furthermore, while fear of negative evaluation is central to 
social anxiety disorder, some authors agree that it is but one aspect of social anxiety, 
which limits our conclusions about the relations of examined variables with the entire 
spectrum of social anxiety symptoms (Teale Sapach et al., 2014). Similarly, while 
worry is a dominant feature of generalized anxiety disorder, PSWQ does not asses 
the severity of GAD symptoms. Finally, correlational nature of the design limits 
conclusions about causality and whether changes in anxiety sensitivity, intolerance 
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Kognitivna osjetljivost na anksioznost:  




Cilj je ovoga rada bio ispitati učinke ličnosti, anksiozne osjetljivosti, netolerancije neizvjesnosti i 
samopoštovanja na različite simptome anksioznosti. Uzorak je činilo 436 studenata, koji su ispunili 
mjere ličnosti, anksiozne osjetljivosti, netolerancije neizvjesnosti, samopoštovanja te simptoma 
panike, brige i socijalne anksioznosti. Rezultati su pokazali da neuroticizam, savjesnost i zabrinutost 
za mentalnu nedostatnost (anksiozna osjetljivost) predviđaju simptome panike, te da zabrinutost za 
mentalnu nedostatnost posreduje u odnosu između neuroticizma i panike. Brigu su predviđali 
neuroticizam, prospektivna i inhibitorna netolerancija neizvjesnosti te samosviđanje, s tim da je 
netolerancija neizvjesnosti posredovala između neuroticizma i brige. Konačno, neuroticizam, 
otvorenost za iskustva i ekstraverzija, kao i socijalna zabrinutost (anksiozna osjetljivost), inhibitorna 
netolerancija neizvjesnosti i samosviđanje predviđali su socijalnu anksioznost. Socijalna 
zabrinutost, inhibitorna netolerancija neizvjesnosti i samosviđanje posredovali su u odnosu 
neuroticizma i ekstroverzije sa simptomima socijalne anksioznosti. Naši rezultati podržavaju 
pretpostavku o tome da je neuroticizam opći rizični čimbenik, te da anksiozna osjetljivost, 
netolerancija neizvjesnosti i samopoštovanje mogu imati specifične učinke na simptome 
anksioznosti.  
 
Ključne riječi: ličnost, anksiozna osjetljivost, netolerancija neizvjesnosti, samopoštovanje, 
simptomi anksioznosti 
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